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Abstract  
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government’s power system and aspects of policy enforcement. Studies on villages, 
on the other hand, are frequently discussed in the context of villagers’ autonomy, 
with attention paid to factors such as the election systems and autonomy issues. This 
paper examines how collective economies and village election shape the relationship 
between township governments and villages (village chiefs) from the perspective of 
the principal-agent approach, based on case studies of China’s coastal region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) is a semigovernmental, 
nonpartisan, nonprofit research institute, founded in 1958. The Institute 
merged with the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) on July 1, 1998.  
The Institute conducts basic and comprehensive studies on economic and 
related affairs in all developing countries and regions, including Asia, the 
Middle East, Africa, Latin America, Oceania, and Eastern Europe. 
 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s).  Publication does 
not imply endorsement by the Institute of Developing Economies of any of the views 
expressed within. 
 
INSTITUTE OF DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (IDE), JETRO 
3-2-2, WAKABA, MIHAMA-KU, CHIBA-SHI 
CHIBA 261-8545, JAPAN 
 
©2020 by author(s) 
No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the 
author(s).
 1 
 
 
Village Chiefs in China: Incomplete Agents 
                   
 
Zhe Ren   
Institute of Developing Economies, Japan  
 
 
This paper discusses the relationship between township leaders and 
village chiefs in China. Townships (xiang or zhen in Chinese) are the 
smallest administrative unit and form the lowest administrative level within 
the three-tiered system of government under Chinese law (provincial, county, 
and township). Outside this system, villages are autonomous units, and the 
head of the village committee (commonly called the village chief) is elected by 
villagers. In political science, township governments and villages are often 
dealt with in different contexts. Studies on township government often focus 
on intergovernmental relations, hierarchy within the government’s power 
system, and issues concerning policy enforcement (Zhang 2007; Yang and Su 
2002; Sun and Guo 2000; Zhang 2011; Zhou 2017). However, studies on 
villages frequently highlight villagers’ autonomy and examine issues such as 
the election system and autonomy1 (Zhang et al. 2000; He 2007, 2016; 
                                                   
1Numerous books and papers have discussed village autonomy in contemporary China over the past two 
decades and mentioning all of these works here is beyond the scope of the present paper. More on this 
topic is covered by the works of Professor Kevin O’Brien (University of California, Berkeley) and 
Professor Lianjiang Li (Chinese University of Hong Kong). 
 2 
 
O’Brien 1994; Diamond and Myers 2001). To understand grassroots politics 
in contemporary China, it is important to grasp the actual relationship 
between townships and villages. 
The relationship between township leaders and village chiefs in 
contemporary China is a political puzzle. Researchers have maintained that 
China’s bureaucratic system leads to a strong political contracting 
framework (Cao 2011, 2014; Zhou 2008, 2014; Zhou 2014a, 2014b; Landry 
2008, 2012). Within this framework, the career of cadres is strongly related 
to contract performance, which may be measured by economic development 
in addition to other aspects of political and social development. Accordingly, 
studies have argued that political contracting is applied to leadership 
positions at both the town and village levels and that comparable 
“contractual” demands comprise both township leaders and village chiefs. 
Certain characteristics of the two positions, however, differ vastly in terms of 
leadership performance and accountability.  
For instance, a cadre’s career highly depends on their performance and 
assessments by higher-level cadres. In contrast, a village chief is only elected 
via a village election. Moreover, once elected, a village chief cannot be 
dismissed by the township government unless the village chief is convicted of 
crime. Furthermore, because the village chief is an elected leader, they do not 
necessarily have a clear and strongly determined career path akin to that of 
a cadre seeking advancement within the bureaucratic system. For these and 
other reasons, it is doubtful that the conventional political contracting model 
can adequately explain the complex relationships that exist today between 
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village chiefs and township leaders in China.  
Discussions on the relationship between township governments and 
villages can be traced back to when village autonomy was experimentally 
initiated in the 1980s. The focus of discussion at the time was twofold. The 
first area of discussion was whether villages were truly autonomous 
organizations or best understood as government agencies of township 
governments. The second area focused on whether the role of township 
governments’ relationship with villages was “leadership” (ling dao) or 
“guidance” (zhi dao) (Peng 1991). When the “Village Committee Organization 
Law” was enacted in 1998 and village committee elections were conducted 
nationwide, related research on this topic increased sharply (Guo 2001, 
2003; Li and Dong 2004; Li and Xiong 1998; Wang and Yang 2001; Xu and 
Xiang 2003; Cai 2000; O’Brien and Li 2000). Studies in the present day have 
not taken a considerably different approach from that used in the 1980s. 
Scholars mainly focus on how to guarantee village autonomy under the 
one-party system.  
However, with China undergoing rapid urbanization, the relationship 
between townships and villages appears to be changing. Two points are of 
particular importance. First, the villages’ land resources have substantially 
increased in importance during the urbanization process. According to the 
“Land Management Law,” governments wanting to use a village’s land 
cannot proceed to do so without first obtaining approval from the village 
committee. As the land price rises, the villagers’ financial interest in the 
transfer of land also rises, which makes it difficult for the village committee 
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to transfer land arbitrarily. In other words, urbanization has made village 
committees even more important in grassroots politics. Second, due to the 
abolition of agricultural taxation, the main work of village chiefs has shifted 
from tax collection to the provision of public services (Yang and Su 2002).  
Public services can be understood from the perspective of village 
committees that have changed from autonomous organizations to 
administrative organizations. Prior to the abolition of the agricultural tax in 
2006, village committee expenses were usually covered by taxes and fees 
collected from villagers; after the abolition of the tax, villages instead now 
rely on subsidies from the township government. Therefore, it is important 
to investigate how these changes have affected the relationship between 
townships and villages. 
The purpose of this paper was to analyze how the relationship between 
township governments and villages are changing under the circumstances of 
rapid urbanization. Specifically, what kind of leverage do villages have in 
negotiations concerning requests and commands from townships? As the role 
of villages increases dramatically, how do township governments motivate 
and provide incentives to village chiefs? Our goal was not to merely note 
differences between township governments and villages but to analyze 
in-depth the ambiguous institution of villages as they have developed in 
contemporary China.   
The relationships between township governments and villages differ 
vastly from region to region. In this paper, we focus on several cases from 
Guangdong Province. The economic development of rural Guangdong is 
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strong; election of village committee members is also a well-established 
routine. In recent years, there has been a dramatic increase in 
disagreements in the province over land profit distribution caused by rapid 
urbanization, thus making comparative studies possible2. In the present 
paper, cases were primarily developed through fieldwork conducted in 
January 2012, May 2014, November 2015, and November 2018. 
This paper is structured as follows. The first section will introduce 
previous studies that analyze the relationship between townships and 
villages and review their findings and limitations. The second section will 
discuss the discretionary powers of village chiefs with particular focus on 
collectively owned enterprises and land transfer, and consider differences 
from contractual relations between other levels of government. The third 
section will address the kinds of countermeasures taken by township 
governments to influence the actions of village chiefs. The last section will 
briefly summarize the findings of this paper and discuss areas for further 
investigation. 
 
Are villages a branch of township government? 
 
In China, four administrative levels are established under the central 
                                                   
2It is widely known that lineages play important roles in rural societies, especially in South China. From 
my fieldwork, I recognize that lineages are deeply embedded in rural politics and the daily lives of 
villagers, even after the country’s rapid urbanization. However, I have also found that lineages can not 
dominate rural politics, particularly when dealing with disputes of interest in villages (Ren 2013). The 
present paper focuses on the institution and system instead of non-institutional factors. For the role of 
lineage in South China, Hsien-chin Hu’s work (Hu 1948) is a classical monograph. 
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government, namely province, city, county, and township. Township 
governments are at the lowest administrative level and have limited political 
power compared with the other levels of government. They are entities 
responsible for implementing various policies from higher levels of 
government; they are also the smallest administrative unit, which allows 
them to receive public opinions and societal requests. Two aspects of 
township governments are key to our discussion: their multi-layered 
intergovernmental relationship within the tiered system of government, and 
their relationship with villages.  
In recent years, it has become common in China studies to analyze 
multi-layered intergovernmental relationships by applying the 
principal-agent theory, and many researchers even apply this approach to 
the relationship between townships and villages (e.g., Zhou 2008). This 
theory focuses on how responsible bureaucrats (agents) at lower 
governmental levels take full responsibility for achieving targets related to 
general operations in politics, economics, and society based on directions of 
officials at higher levels government (principals). According to Zhou (2008), a 
representative researcher of this methodology, higher-level governments 
bestow rewards such as certificates, bonuses, and promotions, based on the 
achievement status of goals set for lower-level governments. The criteria for 
evaluating performance are clearly delineated and empirically measured. In 
addition, bureaucrats operate in a severely competitive environment, so 
those who are high achievers are likely to be promoted to higher-level 
positions. For example, a township leader may be promoted to deputy 
 7 
 
governor of the county, and the governor of the county to deputy mayor. 
Therefore, many bureaucrats are enthusiastic about delivering excellent 
results during their term of office. 
A key feature of centralized bureaucratic systems is that higher levels of 
government apply pressure at varying levels onto lower levels of government. 
Lower levels cannot escape the control of higher levels because they are 
under the command and direction of the higher levels; it is sometimes 
inevitable that a lower-level government will violate the law or bend rules to 
protect its interests. Such characteristics are a remarkable aspect of China’s 
political system as well, to which scholars refer as a “pressure-type regime” 
(ya li xing ti zhi) (Rong et al., 1998). Zhou (2008) has researched the 
“pressure-type regime,” and finds that this regime type is not only a passive 
characteristic of lower-level governments, but also reflective of their active 
strategies for engaging in governmental duties (e.g., a lower-level 
government may aim at achieving a goal that exceeds the growth rate of 
gross domestic product set by the higher-level government). Therefore, Zhou 
emphasizes that strong incentives are required for bureaucrats in lower 
levels of government to survive the competition for promotions. 
There are three aspects to the mechanism by which “administrative 
contracting and promotional competition” occur. First, organizations must be 
highly systemized. Contractual relationships occur at the top of each 
administrative level and each administrative level comprises various 
organized divisions. Therefore, in organizations that are highly systemized, 
it is possible to decompose contracted duties further and carry them out more 
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concretely than in organizations that are not highly systemized. Second, 
higher-level governments have sufficient authority to control lower-level 
governments (Williamson 1999). Lower-level governments need sufficient 
discretion, but higher-level governments must have power to withdraw or 
intervene at its discretion from time to time. Third, there must be a strong 
incentive (high-powered incentive) for lower-level governments to achieve 
good results consistently. 
Lindblom (1983) addresses three effective ways that political and 
economic organizations may exercise control over people: exchange, authority, 
and persuasion. Exchange is an important method that is always discussed 
in principal-agent relations (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1984). The strong 
incentives mentioned above fall into this category. Authority refers to the 
partial overlap with the authority to manage and control people that is 
described by Williamson (1999). Persuasion involves transaction costs of 
institutional economics and is difficult to measure. To avoid discussion about 
persuasion, Kato (2013) used the keyword “vague system,” whereas Zhou 
simply placed this concept into contracts between governments. Exchange 
and authority are effective in the top (principal) to bottom (agent) direction, 
but persuasion has a bidirectional characteristic. The principal can persuade 
the agent, or the agent can persuade the principal in the opposite direction to 
modify the contract. Therefore, it is important to identify the role that 
persuasion plays between the principal and the agent in their inverse 
dependency. 
Then, what happens if these three conditions are applied to the 
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relationship between townships and villages? Because township 
governments are the lowest administrative organizations, they act as agents 
of higher-level governments, but it cannot be principals themselves. This 
distinction is the most significant difference between township governments 
and other levels of government. Many researchers, including Zhou (2008), 
understand villages as agents of township governments and explain that the 
relationship between the two are extensions of intergovernmental 
relationships extending from higher levels of government. Certainly, for a 
long time, villages could be viewed as agents of township governments, and 
this remains a strong characteristic in China today. However, strictly 
speaking, the relationship between township governments and villages is not 
an extension of intergovernmental relationships for several reasons. 
First, the organization of villages (i.e., village committee and party 
branch) is not systemized, unlike the other administrative levels. Village 
committees comprise only a few members, and there are no other 
subordinate organizations3. Division of work at the village organization level 
is not a significant concern, and duties are assigned as needed by the village 
committee. To quote a Chinese expression, “There are thousands of threads 
(i.e., missions given by a township government), but a single needle (i.e., 
village committee, including the village chief).” All jobs highly depend on the 
judgment of the village chief. 
                                                   
3In some very large villages, there are non-official subordinate organizations, such as security units (zhi 
bao dui) and environmental sanitation units (huan wei dui), and unit members are village residents (ben 
cun hu kou). In many cases, these are flat organizations and lack a hierarchy system. Not all villagers 
have equal opportunity to become a unit member; those villagers who voted for the current village chief 
in the election have a higher likelihood of becoming a unit member. 
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Second, in villages’ relationship with township governments, there is no 
authority for strong management control over intergovernmental 
relationships. Township officials are appointed by higher-level governments 
as agents of state power at the lowest end of the administrative hierarchy. 
However, villages are autonomous units, and village chiefs are chosen by the 
villagers. Since the village elections were fully implemented in 1998, village 
chiefs have been elected in most areas of the country. The government has no 
authority to appoint village chiefs, and a village chief ’s term of office is 
guaranteed by law, so villages have certain autonomy from township 
governments. Of course, in reality, village chiefs receive various orders and 
instructions from the township governments. However, even if a village does 
not obey orders, the township government cannot remove the village chief 
from their duties. 
Furthermore, the bureaucratic incentive to seek promotions does not 
apply to village chiefs. The village chief is the head of an autonomous 
organization, with no direct upward path beyond that organization; they 
exist outside the bureaucratic system. Without the frequent personnel 
changes among public officials at other levels of government, there is no 
promotion competition based on performance. Also, there are no age 
restrictions or term limits for village chiefs, unlike those that exist within 
the bureaucratic system. Commonly, village executives later become state 
bureaucrats via civil servant exams, but this can hardly be viewed as 
promotion competition within the bureaucratic system. In Guangdong 
Province, there are attempts to select highly regarded village chiefs as 
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members for appointment as leaders in the government, but the numbers are 
very limited. Therefore, the strong incentives for agents, which is a major 
premise of Zhou’s (2008) analytical model, is only partially applicable to the 
relationship between villages and townships. 
In cases where the management control authority over the agent is 
insufficient, and a strong incentive cannot be provided, a kind of inverse 
dependent relationship is created between the principal and the agent. Full 
cooperation by agents with principals is necessary for their relationship to 
continue. When an agent does not actively cooperate with the principal, the 
principal can dismiss the agent. However, dismissal is most practical when 
there is only one agent (or more than one in some cases) to be dismissed; it is 
impossible to replace the entire organization represented by the agent. 
Returning to the relationship between townships and villages, if a village 
chief does not cooperate with the work of the township government, the 
township government cannot use an administrative order to remove the 
village chief. According to the process under the “Village Committee 
Organizational Law,” the only way township governments can attempt to 
remove village chiefs is via village conventions. Such attempts require 
substantial effort and are not always successful; further, attempts at such 
removal could harm social stability. Even if the village chief changes, it is 
difficult to change the entire power structure of the village. Therefore, 
compared with other administrative levels, in the relationship between 
townships and villages, a situation develops where the principal strongly 
depends on the agent. 
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Indeed, without the cooperation of village chiefs, township governments 
cannot achieve goals set by higher-level governments. Township 
governments must, therefore, attempt to mobilize village chiefs via various 
incentives, such as economic benefits and broad discretion. However, village 
chiefs have the right to refuse to act in ways requested by township 
governments. Of course, village chiefs do not always stand against township 
governments. In civil service, bureaucrats can be transferred to another 
division or location, but village chiefs cannot be moved in such a way. Even if 
a village chief is removed from their duties, they often continue to live in the 
village, which means that the chief must consider many factors when 
making decisions. In particular, if a conflict of interest occurs in a land 
transfer, the village chief will be put in a difficult situation. If the chief 
decides to cooperate with the township government, the villagers may not 
necessarily respond favorably. Villagers sometimes organize protests such as 
the “Wukan incident,” which put significant pressure on the government. 
Such situations lead to a tense relationship between the township 
governments as part of the broader administrative system and villages as 
autonomous units. 
 
Powers of village chiefs 
 
“Village chief” is the official title of the leader of the village committee. The 
village committee is an autonomous organization that carries out the daily 
work of the village, and the village chief is selected via direct elections. The 
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main job of the committee is to handle the village’s daily work. Meanwhile, 
the committee must complete various tasks assigned by the township 
government. Although the village chief is located outside the bureaucratic 
system, they take on many administrative works from the township 
government on a subcontract basis. The grassroots autonomous system of 
the village and the hierarchical system of the state bureaucracy intersect at 
the village chief, and both villagers and the state administration consider the 
village chief as their agent (Xu 1997). The village chief ’s discretion is derived 
from being an agent of both sides. 
For many years, village chiefs had a remarkable amount of discretionary 
authority and power in deciding the use of money (both subsidies from the 
government and taxes and fees collected from the villagers). However, when 
the agricultural tax was abolished in 2006, it became impossible to collect 
taxes and fees from the villagers, and the finances of many villages depended 
solely on government subsidies. Many subsidies have a specific purpose for 
which they are provided, and the village chief has limited discretionary 
authority. However, the village chief ’s scope of discretion has expanded to 
other areas such as collectively owned enterprises and village land use. 
 
Collectively owned enterprises 
A collectively owned enterprise is a company owned and operated by the 
village. In poor rural areas in inland areas of China, there are not many 
studies on the collective economy. However, collectively owned enterprises 
are more common in coastal regions and rural areas around major cities. It is 
a well-known story in China where talented village chiefs set up collectively 
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owned enterprises, and their business succeeded greatly, which leads to 
enriching villagers’ lives. The village chief has discretion in deciding on what 
kind of business the village will engage, what kinds of economic activities are 
carried out, and how to allocate corporate earnings. Launching a company 
may not cause many disputes, but disputes are much more likely to arise 
over the distribution of corporate profits. 
A typical example of this is the “Wukan incident.” In Wukan village, a 
former village chief set up a collectively owned enterprise, which was later 
targeted in a crack-down on fraudulent activity. The development of the 
collectively owned enterprise considerably improved the village’s economic 
situation, so far as being chosen as a “model village” due to its success in 
economic development. In this case and others, the allocation of profits 
earned from collectively owned enterprises led to problems. 
There is one interesting episode about the distribution of profits. This 
story was brought up in an interview with Mr. Zhang, who was the village 
chief in a wealthy village in City C in Guangdong Province (interview, April 
2014). The collectively owned business in this village began by lending a 
building to a company, such that the village now owns several collectively 
owned enterprises. The village chief was concurrently president of all 
companies owned by the village. Among the businesses, the village operated 
a guarantee company, but because it is not possible for a village to establish 
a guarantee company, the company was registered under the name of the 
local township government (the township government and village divided 
the profit at a fixed rate). Due to good corporate earnings, the villagers 
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received many dividends exceeding 10,000 RMB per person. To prevent 
farmers from becoming “lazy people relying on dividends,” the municipal 
government of City C stipulated an annual maximum dividend of 5,000 RMB, 
and the remainder would be used for social welfare and pension funds. 
However, the profit of the collectively owned businesses was so enormous 
that even after setting aside funds for social welfare and pensions, there 
remained a surplus of funds. At the discretion of the village chief, public 
input was received on how to use the surplus funds. This village chief 
regularly allowed the villagers to decide how to use the surplus funds at 
village committee meetings. The villagers’ preference was always the same: 
more dividends. Based on the villagers’ demands, the village chief 
distributed money to the villagers via various means other than dividends. 
The township government and villagers were both well aware that these acts 
violate provisions; nevertheless, because the village’s economic and social 
situation was stable, the local government remained silent. Further, the 
township government proposed to jointly invest and set up a new company 
with the village. 
Of course, the village chief’s discretion is not infinite. Villagers who oppose 
the village chief’s ideas may impede their decisions by securing a majority 
vote on the village committee. The case of Yakou village (Zhongshan city) is a 
unique case where the village leadership and villagers were in conflict over 
the management of collective businesses. The collectively owned enterprises 
in the Pearl River Delta region are mainly related to urbanization and 
industrialization, with Yakou village being an exception to this trend as it 
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operated a large group farm commonly referred to as the last “People’s 
Commune.” The village transferred some of the farm’s land to companies and 
used the profits to fund agricultural activities. The village maintained 
control over the land, rather than deferring to use of a contract system for 
allocating responsibility for the land. The opinion of the village chief and the 
villagers were in conflict over how to set up this collectively owned enterprise. 
To summarize, as the price of the land soared, the villagers wanted to 
transfer ownership of the land so they would receive their personal shares of 
the profit immediately (Nan fang zhou mo, September 2, 2011). 
Meanwhile, the village chief insisted on renting the land without 
transferring ownership. The village chief was taking a long-term perspective 
on the business, which would continue to operate and own the land, which 
was viewed as guaranteeing a living income for farmers. Compared with 
lending income, however, transferring land ownership might have returned 
a better profit (140,000 RMB per person). Therefore, many villagers 
preferred to transfer the land ownership. After repeated negotiations, the 
villagers eventually decided to transfer land ownership at a village 
committee meeting. The land was then used for tourism and resort 
development, which was actively promoted by the mayor of Zhongshan at 
that time. Provided the development goes smoothly, there is possibility of 
expansion of facilities to surrounding land (Nan fang zhou mo, September 2, 
2011). 
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Deciding the use of land 
Rural land in China is held under a collective ownership system with 
individuals having only user rights. Moreover, if agricultural land is used for 
purposes other than agriculture, government permission is required. In 
many cases, the government acquires agricultural land and then transfers it 
to other users on the land market. With the progress of urbanization, the 
amount of agricultural land transferred for purposes other than agriculture 
has increased dramatically. The cooperation of village chiefs is indispensable 
for completing these land transfers. At the initial stage of acquiring land, the 
government and the villagers come to understand the situation of the other 
party via the village chief, who then attempts to persuade the local 
government if there are any villager objections. If the village chief succeeds 
in convincing the villagers of the local government’s perspective, they may 
receive a certain reward from the government. However, if the village chief 
fails, then their year-end bonus is affected. 
In the case of Yakou village, the village chief strongly felt that the land 
should not be sold. However, a different scenario emerged from another case 
where a village chief (city C, Town H) did not cooperate with the 
government’s land-use plan and embarrassed the government (interview, 
April 2014). This village chief always held a tough stance against the 
government, which was one of the reasons why he was elected. This village’s 
land was included in the government land-use plan, but the chief was 
uncooperative in the land transfer process, such that it was delayed. At the 
village election, the township government supported an alternative 
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candidate, but this candidate was not in a position to win the election. The 
village’s party secretary wanted to cooperate with the government, but the 
party secretary has no decision-making power over land transfers. Only the 
village chief can legally represent the village. After negotiations, the 
township government embarked on a plan to do away with this 
“troublesome” village chief, the method of which is interesting. The 
government’s strategy was to promote the villagers’ dissatisfaction toward 
the village chief by freezing part of the subsidy given to the village and later 
calling for a vote of no-confidence in the village chief at a village committee 
meeting. 
Of course, the discretion of the village chief does not necessarily extend far 
in all villages. In the case of Village F in Town E of City C (interview, April 
2014), it was not the administrative village that owned the land, but rather, 
each natural village (small village group). Before merging the natural 
villages to form the current administrative village, the natural villages had 
already started a collectively owned business, and this set-up had not 
changed, even after the merge. The administrative village owned little land, 
and the scale of the collective business (mainly in the tourism industry) was 
relatively small. Thus, although the natural villages were rich economically, 
the administrative village was relatively poor. Because the administrative 
village lacked economic power, the cooperation of the natural villages was 
indispensable for completing tasks set by the township government. As a 
result, the village chief always had to negotiate with the persons in charge of 
the natural villages to accomplish tasks. For example, the Public Security 
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Bureau requested that villages install and pay for a surveillance monitoring 
system that cost 300,000 RMB, without help from the government. In a 
neighboring village, the village spent about 250,000 RMB of its funds and 
obtained a subsidy of 50,000 RMB from the township government. So, the 
chief of Village F negotiated with leaders of natural villages for the budget. 
On the other hand, he bargained with the local government for subsidies, 
even if they were only small amounts. 
In recent years, Village F has been incorporated into a newly established 
economic development zone, and the government has proceeded with land 
acquisition. Revenue from land transfers mainly went to the natural villages, 
and the income of the administrative village was limited. The greatest 
benefit to the administrative village was the returned land (liu yong di). The 
higher the percentage of returned land, the higher the incentive for the 
village to acquire land. In Town A, where economic development is more 
advanced in City C, land acquisition was proceeding very smoothly because 
the township government returned about 40% of the acquired land to the 
village. However, in Village F, the village chief repeatedly claimed for the 
proportion of returned land be around 10% to 15%, which was less than the 
other towns. 
Thus, the village chief’s authority can be important when the village’s 
collective economy is developing and when the village controls the land in 
the area. Moreover, because the village committee members are 
representatives chosen by elections, the township government does not have 
the authority to appoint and fire village chiefs. There are also no restrictions 
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on the number of terms served by village chiefs, so the same person can try 
to remain as the village chief for a long time. Therefore, a competent person 
with skill in enterprise management who is elected village chief can become 
a powerful person in local politics. How important is the chief’s influence? A 
deputy chief of Town C stated, “You can refuse to meet a business person, 
but you cannot ever reject the invitation of the village chief.” 
Increasing the presence of elected chiefs in rich villages does not mean the 
economic power could become a veto power against township government. 
The abilities of negotiation and compromise with various parts inside and 
outside villages make village chiefs’ presence in local politics more stable. 
Over-emphasizing the veto power would not lead to a better result. As 
evident in the case of Wukan, the villagers’ passion and strong will (to claim 
back their land) successfully changed the decisions of the village chief and 
village committee members at the outset. However, later, passion and will 
became so-called “legitimacy” to judge everything related to land issues. 
Voting power turned into a veto power that made reaching a compromise 
between the township government and village difficult.  
How to reach a compromise? Either strong pressure from township 
government or hard veto power from village could hardly settle down. In the 
end, both sides have to rely on the village chief to reach the goal. Therefore, 
the increasing presence of the village chief can be argued to have changed 
the course of persuasion from unidirectional (top to bottom) to bidirectional.   
Unlike economic activities where principals can freely select agents, the 
degree of freedom that village chiefs enjoy is very limited in terms of 
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intergovernmental relations. In the relationship between township 
governments and villages, the level of freedom of the township governments 
is even more restricted, and a situation arises where principals depend on 
agents. Therefore, township governments, as principals, must observe the 
behavior of agents and consider the costs of replacing agents (village chiefs) 
versus the cost of compromising. 
 
Response of township governments 
 
Regardless of the extent of a chief ’s influence, they will not fundamentally 
change the governance of the township government. The strategy of the 
township government in the relationship with the village is to control the 
chief, much like the county government tries to control the top at the 
township level4. However, as stated in the previous section, there is no 
administrative control and there is no incentive for promotion, so the 
government attempts to exert influence on the village in other ways. One 
way is to have the village’s party secretary simultaneously serve as the 
village chief. This allows the township not only to inform the village of the 
township government’s intentions via party mechanisms but also to 
understand the actions and motivation of the village. Another way to 
maintain high motivation is to offer a strong economic incentive, instead of a 
promotion incentive. Furthermore, local governments are attempting to 
promote the “separation of politics and economics” (zheng jing fen li) at the 
                                                   
4 Zhao (2005) argues that control power from township government is stronger than people’s commune 
era in certain field, and causes disconnection of local government from the society.   
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village level to weaken the economic independence of autonomous 
organizations. 
 
Concurrent positions in the village and party leadership 
One way to communicate the government’s intention to villages is to use the 
channel of the party organization. Many studies have reported on the 
relationship between the secretary of the party branch and village chiefs 
(Wang and Yang 2001; Xu 1997), so there is no need to elaborate on this topic 
here. For the government to gain a more advantageous position, it is common 
for the party secretary to serve as village chief (yi jian tiao) concurrently and 
to have other executive members of the village party branch concurrently 
serve as village committee members (jiao cha ren zhi). 
In the case of Guangdong Province in 2013, in areas including Shaoguan, 
Meizhou, Jiangmen, Yangjiang, Maoming, Zhaoqing, and Qingyuan, the 
percentage of villages with concurrent placement of party members as 
village chiefs and village committee members was above 80%. In Zhuhai, 
Foshan, and Huizhou, the percentage of villages with the concurrent 
placement of party members as village chiefs was 80% and the percentage of 
villages with party members concurrently placed on village committees was 
around 60%. In Guangzhou and Zhongshan, both percentages were 65%5. In 
November 2013, Hu Chunhua (the party secretary of Guangdong Province) 
set a policy goal of further raising concurrent posts in village committee 
elections and party branch elections to be held in April of 2014. In response 
                                                   
5 “Guan cha zhe,” http://www.guancha.cn/politics/2013_11_15_185819.shtml, accessed on 
August 10, 2015. 
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to this goal, each level of government set concrete numerical targets. In the 
bureaucratic process, when the target was transferred from the provincial 
level to the township level, the lower-level government, which is the agent, 
was very aggressive. Certain areas (Yunfu and Huizhou) that were already 
exceeding 80% concurrent posts set a goal of 90% (“Nan fang ri bao,” 
February 27, 2014). In areas where the numbers were relatively low, such as 
Guangzhou and Zhongshan, a goal exceeding 80% was set. The lower-level 
government responded actively. In Huizhou city, where the goal exceeded 
90%, several county governments set a goal of 100% (e.g., Boluo County and 
Huiyang District in the Huizhou city jurisdiction) 6. As a result, these 
numerical targets were achieved in most areas of Guangdong. Even in areas 
where the rate was low such as Zhongshan, the ratio of party members 
concurrently placed as village chiefs reached 90.4%, which exceeds the 
original goal. 
The goal of attaining concurrent postings is strengthening jurisdictional 
control authority in areas where the government was weaker in 
administrative channels by utilizing the party channel. It is premature to 
judge how effective this attempt was in increasing government authority 
over autonomous villages. It could be positive in terms of decreasing the 
friction between village parties and village committees and would lower the 
overall number of village executives. However, many voices are questioning 
whether township governments are overly involved in village elections. Of 
                                                   
6 “Nan fang ri bao,” December 4, 2013;[Hui yang qu ren min zheng fu wang] 
http://xxgk.huiyang.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/9421/2.2/201312/252993.html, 
accessed on September 1, 2015. 
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course, it is impossible to motivate village chiefs simply by strengthening 
party channels. It is important to ensure that economic interests help 
maintain a high level of incentives for village chiefs. 
 
Economic incentives 
To increase incentives for village chiefs, economic profit is particularly 
important, and other factors such as social honor and future prospects hold 
some but lower importance. The salary schemes for village chiefs and other 
village executives are not clearly stated and vary widely from region to 
region. Even if they are made clear, there are many cases where the village 
manager does not receive a regularly paid salary. Therefore, when analyzing 
economic incentives for village chiefs, it is impossible to compare across a 
wide range of regions. To make a comparative case study, the cases in this 
paper are limited to economically rich areas in Guangdong Province. 
According to the Regulation of Salary Management for Rural Cadres in 
Dongguan City (Dong guan shi nong cun gan bu xin chou guan li ban fa), 
which outlines village executives’ salaries in Guangdong Province, the 
village chief’s income consists of three parts: basic salary, expense allowance, 
and performance pay. The base salary is higher than the residents’ average 
income, but the upper limit is set so that it does not exceed twice the average 
income. For the expense allowance, the actual value may vary. However, it 
generally provides funds to cover work-related expenses and per Diem 
allowances (such as when traveling to participate in government meetings). 
Performance pay is based on the profit of the collectively owned enterprise in 
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the current fiscal year and an evaluation of success in public management 
duties. To limit the disparity between regions, the maximum amount of 
income is set in the regulation, and specific limits are set by the township 
government. The average annual income of village executives was the 
highest in Dongguan city in 2014 at 336,000 RMB; the lowest was 4,570 
RMB. From the perspective of average income by source, the base salary is 
29.1%, the expense allowance is 18.3%, and performance pay is 52.6%. 
Ultimately, performance pay is the main source of income differences across 
villages. In other words, the higher the profitability of the collectively owned 
enterprise and the higher the evaluation of public management duties from 
the government, the higher an official’s income is. Of course, if a collectively 
owned enterprise falls into deficit or if the executive’s performance 
evaluation is low, the salary will be reduced. At the same time, in this 
regulation, it is clearly stipulated that salaries paid to executives will be 
primarily derived from the revenues of collectively owned enterprises. If a 
village does not have a collectively owned enterprise, each township 
individually regulates compensation. 
According to interviews I conducted on the situation in City C, the 
performance evaluation criteria for the village chief was determined by 
applying the performance evaluation criteria of township leaders, which 
include more than 140 items. All performance evaluation criteria items are 
scored, and the performance evaluation is determined by the total score. For 
village chiefs with excellent performance evaluation, performance pay equal 
to 150% of the base salary is given; village chiefs with a low evaluation have 
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their performance pay reduced. Although performance pay is different for 
each town, it averages about 100,000 RMB per year. An annual income of 
100,000 RMB may be attractive for those in areas where economic 
development is relatively low. However, such a salary in the Pearl River 
Delta may not be so attractive to a village chief. In Guangdong, many 
villages receive profit from collectively owned enterprises over 100 million 
RMB. As stated by a deputy town chief in Town A in City C, “Even if 1% of 
the net profit of the collectively owned enterprises is earmarked as income of 
the village chief, the amount is colossal, and it is a very attractive job” 
(interview, April 2014). 
The incentives for village chiefs are not limited to performance pay. In the 
example of the village chief (Mr. Zhang) discussed above, his business card 
notes his position as party secretary and village chief, as well as his village’s 
collectively owned companies. He is also the president of a private 
corporation not listed on his business card. The chief ’s family operates the 
private company, which is mainly engaged in subcontracted work with the 
collectively owned enterprises. It is not a new situation for village chiefs and 
their families to run businesses. However, the relationship between such 
private enterprises and collectively owned enterprises of villages is not 
always clear. 
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Separation of politics and economics and transformation of autonomous 
organizations 
One way to decrease the influence of village chiefs is the “separation of 
politics and economics.” This policy refers to the separation of administrative 
affairs (daily work) and economic activities (management of collectively 
owned enterprises) at the village level. 
Village committee elections are intense in areas where the collective 
economy is well-developed because elected village chiefs can also become 
presidents of collectively owned enterprises (Hu 1998). Once in such a 
position, the chief can pursue his economic interests. In some cases, one 
person may concurrently serve as village chief, party secretary, and 
president of multiple companies. Because becoming a village chief may 
provide considerable benefits, elections are intense, and problems are prone 
to occur (interview with a member of the Party Committee in District B in 
City C, April 2014). In addition, by concentrating power on one person, any 
problems that arise in the village committee (especially corruption issue) 
create enormous pressure on the township government. 
“Separation of politics and economics” in the village was launched as a 
measure to solve the problem of village chiefs being overloaded with too 
many duties (“Zhong guo qing niao bao," September 5, 2012). By separating 
the positions of the village chief and president of collectively owned 
enterprises, powers are no longer concentrated on a single person, and the 
village chief and president can immerse themselves in their respective tasks. 
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However, the real aim of separating the positions is weakening the village 
chief’s economic influence. 
To verify the policy effect, we interviewed a party secretary in District B in 
City C. District B was the first area in City C to start a policy of “separation 
of politics and economics,” and its practices drew considerable attention. In 
2014 the district merged ten communities (formerly village committees) into 
four residents’ committees and at the same time implemented a policy of 
“separation of politics and economics.” The first election of the residents’ 
committee was calmer compared with prior contests. Because there was no 
candidate for election in some places, the government persuaded the former 
village committee members to run as candidates. In contrast, the secretary 
predicted that the election to elect the president of a collectively owned 
enterprise planned to take place six months later would be extremely fierce. 
The autonomous village organization is dedicated solely to providing social 
services, and the district government is promoting the idea that the 
collectively owned enterprises exist as entities unrelated to the leadership of 
the village. Thereby, the authority of village officials has been relatively 
weakened (interview, April 2014). In the case of village chiefs, there is not 
much opportunity to openly oppose government policy. However, one 
countermeasure against the policy is splitting the role of the village chief and 
president of collectively owned enterprises within a family—for example, 
having the father as village chief and the son as president of the collectively 
owned enterprises. As long as no troubles arise from such arrangements, the 
District B government will likely maintain its silence on the matter. 
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Interestingly, attempts to concurrently place party members as village 
chiefs and village committee members would not only strengthen the party’s 
role in the village committee but also possibly lower labor costs at the village 
level. However, attempts to separate politics and economics will result in 
increased labor costs because the two organizations were originally 
integrated. Many executives are unhappy with losing their involvement in 
collective business. To resolve their dissatisfaction, District B paid for about 
20 million RMB in expenses and increased expense allowances as part of the 
separation process (interview with District B party committee member, April 
2014). 
 
Does village autonomy have a future? 
 
Previously, when a village chief and other village committee members were 
elected, their compensation was covered by taxes and fees collected from the 
villagers. Therefore, the village committee can be viewed as providing public 
services for the villagers. This was the fundamental logic of village autonomy. 
With the elimination of the agricultural tax and other fees, the expenses of 
village committees are mainly paid using subsidies from the township 
government, which limits the village autonomy in decision making. From 
this perspective, many researchers claim that village committees have 
become another level of government in the multilayered state bureaucracy 
(Tsai 2007) 
In parts of China, where the economic development of villages is 
proceeding, autonomy has been retained for a considerably long time based 
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on economic power. This gave hope to optimistic observers of village 
autonomy. This economic power is one of the most important reasons why 
the Wukan incident attracted so much attention. In the process of 
urbanization and industrialization, the collectively owned enterprises and 
the rising value of land strengthened the role of the village in grassroots 
politics. Moreover, a great change also occurred in the villagers’ 
consciousness, who aimed to protect their interest by making village 
autonomy more reliable. 
Meanwhile, administrative contracts and competition for bureaucratic 
promotions have become a major source of pressure for township 
governments. Township governments regularly hand down duties to villages, 
but their power to control village chiefs is relatively limited. As long as the 
pressure-type regime continues from the upper levels of government, 
township governments will want village committees to act as government 
agencies, rather than as autonomous organizations. 
In the relationship between villages and townships in Guangdong, there 
exists a negotiation between two competing forces. The first is the power of 
villages to maintain their autonomy, and the second is the power of the 
government to use the village as a government agent at the bottom of the 
administrative hierarchy. The government is always leading this negotiation 
from a favorable position, whereas villages can rely on their economic 
strength and the protections under the “Village Committee Organization 
Law.”  
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In the early stages of promoting village autonomy, Peng Zhen, former 
chairperson of the National People’s Congress, stated, “After successfully 
managing villages, then gradually start to handle the township. After 
successfully managing the township, then gradually manage the counties” 
(Peng, 1991, p. 610). At the time, many voices were questioning village 
autonomy, even though the national leadership was optimistic about village 
autonomy. However, considering the situation in Guangdong Province, 
villages’ discretionary power is gradually decreasing due to repeated 
institutional reforms. 
More study needs to be carried out to better grasp these changes. It is vital 
to examine these issues in greater detail. In conducting such work, it would 
be possible to divide townships, villages, and village sub-groups along an 
economic scale and classify them. Further, comparative studies with other 
coastal areas are required to verify the universality of the situation in 
Guangdong Province. 
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